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This paper is about the meaning of the 
progressive aspect, of which it has been 
notoriously difficult to give a satisfying 
account. 1 A number of intriguing properties 
of its meaning were first brought out in 
formal semantic treatments. An event-
semantics approach to the progressive that 
integrates concepts of nonnality and 
perspective as well as adequate lexical 
representations seems to be particularly 
promising. In section 1 I will present several 
problems connected with the semantics of 
the progressive that are crucial for shaping 
its truth conditions. Several solutions to 
these problems that have been suggested in 
the literature will be discussed.2 In section 2 
I will sketch a preliminary account of the 
meaning of the progressive aspect. In section 
2.1 the basic components that underlie the 
truth conditions of the progressive will be 
described. In section 2.2 I will present 
underlying lexical assumptions and the truth 
conditions for the progressive. Finally, in 
section 2.3, I will evaluate the proposal by 
revisiting the problems discussed. 
1 Seven problems out of many 
The imperfective paradox: One of the 
widespread traditional ideas about the 
meaning of the progressive conveys that 
sentences in the progressive aspect refer to 
events in progress, i.e., events that are not 
yet completed. This can be illustrated by a 
very simple scenario: 
Scenario A: Rebecca stepped onto the street, 
walked towards the other side (l), and 
reached the sidewalk . 
While this scenario can be described by a 
sentence in the simple past (1 a), the event in 
progress at reference time l can be referred 
to by a sentence in the progressive, as in 
(lb). 
(1) a. Rebecca crossed the street 
b. Rebecca was crossing the street 
This leads to a very straightforward idea that 
has been formulated in tenns of interval 
semantics by BelIDett and Pariee (1972) and 
that can be rendered in event semantics as in 
PI: 
(Pt) The Extensional Approach 
PROG(p) is true if the event e described 
by PROG(p) is part of an event e' 
described by p. 
Pt requires that the sentence in the simple 
foml p be true in order for the progressive 
sentence PROG(p) to be true. But this is 
wrong. Another simple scenario shows that 
this condition does not, in fact, hold: 
Scenario B: Rebecca stepped onto the street, 
walked towards the other side (l) when she 
stumbled over a pothole and hurt her leg so 
badly she didn't reach the sidewalk on the 
that other side. 
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We can still use (1 b) to refer to this 
situation, which shows that the event does 
not have to culminate to make the 
progressive sentence tme. This observation 
involves the well-known imperfective 
paradox (cf. Dowty 1979:146): With non-
resultative verbs, the progressive sentence 
entails the sentence in the simple form (2a), 
while this is not the case for resultative 
verbs (2b), i.e., verbs that are lexically 
marked for a specific result state. 
(2) a. [Rebecca was pushing the cart ® 
Rebecca pushed the cart] 
b. [Rebecca was crossing the street ® 
Rebecca crossed the street] 
This has led most aspectologists to assume 
that some kind of intensionality is involved 
in the meaning of the progressive. Thus, 
Dowty (1979) provides us with an 
intensional version of PI, making use of the 
notion of "inertia worlds" which can "be 
thought of as worlds which are exactly like 
the given world up to the time in question 
and in which the future course of events 
after this time develops in ways most 
compatible with the past course of events." 
(Dowty 1979: 148). In event semantics, his 
approach aproximately amounts to the 
following: 
(P2) The Normality Approach 
PROG(p) is tme iff in all inertia worlds 
the event e described by PROG(p) is pmi 
of an event e' described by p. 
Thus, according to P2, to evaluate the truth 
of a sentence in the progressive we just have 
to look at those worlds where everything 
proceeds normally. 
The interruption problem: Still, P2 cannot 
deal with numerous cases. To show this, we 
have to bring Rebecca into another 
unpleasant situation (cf. Vlach 1981:285f): 
Scenario C: Rebecca stepped onto the street, 
walked towards the other side very 
inattentively (l)while nearby a bus was 
approaching her driven by a very inattentive 
driver. 
If everything proceeds as can be expected 
from this course of events, the bus will hit 
Rebecca so that she won't reach the other 
side. Thus, P2 predicts that ( 1 a) is false 
under this scenario, but it is not. An 
intermption coming from outside the event 
we are referring to, no matter if it could be 
expected or not, does not affect the tmth of 
the progressive sentence. This leads Vlach 
(1981 :288) to base the tmth conditions for 
the progressive on the possible continuation 
of the event referred to: 
(P3) The Continuity Approach 
PROG(p) is tme iff, in those worlds 
where the event e described by PROG(p) 
continues after the reference time of 
PROG(p), e will be a pmi of an event e' 
described by p. 
The restriction in P3 allows us to do away 
with the bus in Scenario C and just look at 
those worlds where the walking event 
continues beyond the point where it got 
intemlpted in the actual world. But 
Landman (1992:12) observed that the event 
might have continued beyond this point but 
then got intermpted a couple of seconds later 
because there was a second bus coming 
down the street. According to P3, the 
progressive sentence should now be false, 
but it is not. Thus, Landman (1992:12) 
suggested that to improve P3, the condition 
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should include that e continues beyond any 
possible intemlption. 
The impossibility problem: The tmth 
conditions in P3, even in their improved 
version, still cannot cope with another 
problem, as Landman (1992) observed. 
Scenario D: Rebecca was on the beach near 
Bristol, England. She went swimming and 
swam a couple hundred yards towards the 
west (tR). 
We can assume that if Rebecca continues 
what she is doing at l beyond that time and 
the sharks don't get her, she will end up in 
Newfoundland eventually. According to P3, 
the sentence Rebecca was crossing the 
Atlantic should be tme under this scenario, 
but it obviously is not. It seems that ifthere 
is hardly any chance that the event 
culminates, the idea of its unintemlpted 
continuation does not license the 
progressive. Therefore, Landman (1992:25) 
tries to make the concept of "a reasonable 
chance on the basis of what is internal to e in 
w" part of the tmth conditions of the 
progressive. A greatly simplified version of 
this is given in P4: 
(P4) The reasonable-chance approach 
PROG(p) is tme iff, in those worlds 
where there are no event-external 
intermptions, the event e described by 
PROG(p) has a reasonable chance to be 
part of an event e' described by p. 
The intention problem: P4 still does not 
say what distinguishes 'event-external' from 
'event-internal' and what counts as a 
reasonable chance (cf. Glasbey 1996:334). 
Consider the following situation: 
Scenario E: (adapted from Asher 1992:477): 
Rebecca, who was very depressed at the 
time, wanted to commit suicide and 
therefore stepped onto the street and walked 
towards the other side (l) in order to get hit 
by a bus in the middle of the street. 
Under this scenario, (la) is inappropriate. To 
make an agentive progressive sentence tme, 
the agent should not intend that the event 
does not culminate. Landman (1992) 
probably would say that if Rebecca does not 
even intend to cross the street, the event is 
not very likely to culminate. In this case, 
(la) would correctly be predicted as false. 
But Landman does not discuss this problem. 
Naumann and Pifion (1997) try to account 
for the intention problem more directly and 
assume that for a sentence in the progressive 
to be tme, the possible agent of the event 
referred to must - at reference time - be able 
to bring the event to its culmination and may 
not intend to not carry out the whole event. 
Somewhat simplified, their approach looks 
like this: 
(PS) The intention-and-ability approach 
PROG(p) is tme iff there is a world w 
where the event e described by PROG(p) 
is part of an event e' described by p, and 
iff the agent (ifthere is one) is able to 
bring e to a culmination and does not 
intend the non-culmination of e. 
But this seems to be too strict. According to 
PS, the sentences in (3) should be 
impossible since it is explicitly expressed 
that the agent intends the non-culmination of 
the event, but they are not. 3 Intention seems 
to be an important parameter in the tmth 
conditions of the progressive, but it is not a 
necessary condition for agentive progressive 
sentences. 
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(3) a. John intended not to kill Rebecca,but, 
nutritionally ignorant, he was killing 
her by feeding her too much tasty, 
but greasy, food 
b. Although she really intended not to 
do it, she was making him a 
millionaire by placing all his money 
on the skinniest nag at the races 
The perspective problem: Another problem 
is brought up by Landman (1992:30f) in the 
appendix of his paper. It is illustrated by the 
following scenari04 : 
Scenario F: Rebecca was on a plane to 
Boston, which had started at nine o'clock; at 
ten o'clock (l), hijackers forced the captain 
to fly to Bismarck, North Dakota, where 
the plane landed at eleven o'clock. 
Under this scenario we can truthfully utter 
not only (4a), but also (4b). This is 
surprising, since according to the semantics 
of negation, either p or not-p should be true, 
but not both. This cannot be explained by 
any of the approaches discussed. 
(4) a. Rebecca was flying to Boston when 
the plane was hijacked 
b. Rebecca was flying to Boston; well, 
in/act, she wasn't, she was flying to 
Bismarck, but she didn't know that 
at the time 
It seems that in (4a) we adopt a perspective 
that is different from the one we choose in 
(4b). In (4a) the actual outcome of the event 
does not playa role; I will call this the 
'intensional perspective.' (4b), in contrast, is 
vieweci as if from a later point of view. It 
takes the outcome of the event in the actual 
world into consideration; I will call this the 
'extensional perspective.'s 
The 'imperfective-paradox' paradox: 
Among the problems that one comes across 
when thinking about the progressive is a 
problem which is of a more lexical nature 
(cf. Engelberg 1998:308ff): 
Scenario G: In court, the judge examines a 
witness; it is known that the witness 
observed all the incidents relevant to the 
case in question (from at least five o'clock to 
five fifteen) ... 
Ignorant judge: "What was happening at 
five o'clock?" 
Omniscient witness:"] was standing at 
the window at five and] saw that 
Rebecca was killing Jamaal while Linda 
was drying her hair. " 
... (Scenario Gl) At five fifteen Jamaal was 
dead and meanwhile (because her hairdryer 
had broken or she had just decided to do so) 
Linda had stopped drying her hair, which 
was still pretty wet. 
... (Scenario G2) At five fifteen Linda's hair 
was dry and J amaal wasn't dead, since 
Rebecca had stopped strangling him 
(because the rope had broken or she had 
changed her mind). 
Under scenario G 1, the witness told the 
truth; he didn't commit himself to the claim 
that Linda dried her hair completely. But 
under scenario G2 wecannot accept his 
testimony that Rebecca was killing J amaal, 
since he knew that Jamaal survived.6 The 
expecteci imperfective paraciox cioesrrt show 
up, since we tend to conclude that Jamaal 
was dead afterwards. This is the 
'imperfective-paradox' paradox. The 
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following examples show that the denial of 
the event's culmination is nearly impossible 
for the progressive of some verbs: 
(5) a. At five, Linda was drying her hair; 
but in the end, it wasn't completely 
dry. 
b. ?? At five, Rebecca was killing 
Jamaal; but in the end, he wasil 't 
dead. 
c. At five, she was crossing the Red 
Square; but in the end, she hadn't 
completely crossed it. 
d. ?? At five, she was burning down the 
house; but in the end, she hadn't 
burnt it down. 
The 'complex-event' problem: The last 
problem I want to discuss briefly shows up 
with verbs denoting causative events. 
Scellario H: Jamaal was attacking Rebecca 
with a knife and stabbed her a couple of 
times (l\ whereupon Rebecca collapsed; 
lying on the floor (l2), she died in a few 
minutes. 
. 1 fi . Rl t Refernng to t le re erence tIme t sen ence 
(6a) is perfect, while the same sentence 
uttered with respect to l2 is false. According 
to the approaches discussed so far, this is 
unexpected. If we assume that to kill means 
something like 'cause to die,' what is 
. lU . f 1 happenmg at t - IS part 0 t le event 
described in (6b). For causative verbs whose 
causing sub event precedes the caused 
subevent, the progressive has to be related to 
the first, causing sub event. 
(6) a. Jamaal was killing Rebecca 
b. Jamaal killed Rebecca 
2 The meaning of the progressive 
aspect 
2.1 The ingredients 
Mereological relations: The truth 
conditions should express that the event e 
described by PROG(p) is a part of an event 
e ' described by p, where e ' can occur in a 
non-actual world. A part should be 
understood as a 'natural part,' which is not a 
mere temporal stage but something whose 
particular properties allow it to be delineated 
from other units. For example, a particular 
baseball game has as its parts a particular 
homenm, a particular catch, or a particular 
fast ball. Any natural part of an event is a 
sub event, i.e., an event itself which is 
temporally related to all other subevents. 
With respect to events referred to by 
causative verbs like to dry, a causing event 
(i.e., the action perfonned by the agent on 
the theme entity) and a caused event (i.e., 
the theme entity becoming dry) can be 
distinguished as immediate subevents (see 
section 2.2). 
The interruption condition: In section 1 it 
was shown that certain kinds of external 
intemlptions must be abstracted away from 
when judging the truth of a progressive 
sentence. The following scenario (adapted 
from Asher 1992) will show that Landman's 
(1992) vague idea of what is internal to the 
event is too generous. 
Scenario I: Rebecca stood in front of a huge 
minefield, started walking, and walked about 
50 yards into the minefield (tR). 
Under this scenario, the sentence Rebecca is 
crossing the minefield should be odd, since 
i) it is almost impossible that Rebecca 
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complete her crossing and ii) what is 
happening with the minefield (e.g. exploding 
mines) can be considered event-internal 
because the minefield occupies an event-
related argument position. But most 
speakers find the sentence acceptable. Thus, 
a more restricted notion of what is internal 
to the event seems to be in order. I will 
assume that only so-called 'agent-internal 
intemlptions' affect the tmth of the 
progressive. These agent-internal 
intermptions have their origin in the 
immediate domain of the proto-agene; they 
include wrong or missing intentions and 
abilities or sudden changes in intention, 
ability, or physical structure of the agent. All 
other intelTUptions are considered external, 
e.g., the bus in scenario C and the exploding 
mines in scenario I. 
The normality condition: Having 
abstracted away from external intermptions, 
the culmination of the event has to be 
modally restricted in a celiain way to make 
the progressive sentence true. Some have 
suggested that the culmination has to be 
possible (Glasbey 1996, Naumann and 
Pifion 1997), some have assumed that there 
has to be a reasonable chance of culmination 
(Landman 1992)8, and other approaches 
might even imply that the culmination has to 
be probable to make the progressive tme.9 
I'm not 
quite sure if a mere possibility condition 
might be too weak, but a probability 
condition is definitely too strong lO : 
Scenario J: Jamaal was participating in an 
amateur tightrope-walking contest. He 
usually falls off the rope three out of four 
times. He started walking on the rope that 
was tightened across the arena and took a 
couple of steps (tR). 
This scenario can be easily referred to with 
Janzaal was crossing the arena, showing 
that even if it is only remotely possible that 
the crossing is completed, the progressive 
can be used. For the time being, I will 
assume that the modal part just says that, 
external intemlptions aside, the completion 
of the event must be possible. II 
Perspective: The tmth of a sentence in the 
progressive has to be evaluated with respect 
to perspective. To keep things as simple as 
possible, I will assume that there are just two 
perspectives, an extensional one and an 
intensional one, where the choice of a 
perspective is detennined by semantic and 
pragmatic factors. We can conceive 
perspectives as functions from events to sets 
of worlds. The extensional perspective (i) 
assigns the actual world to the event, the 
intensional perspective (ii), and assigns to 
the event all worlds in which the event is not 
externally intermpted: 
(7) a. PerspEXT(e) = {wo} 
b. Pers/NT(e) = {w I e is not =stopped 
in w by agent-external 
intemlptions} 
2.2 The recipe 
Lexical entries: As section 1 has shown, the 
lexical influence on the interpretation of 
sentences in the progressive has to be taken 
into consideration. With some verbs (to kill, 
to burn down), the result state is somehow 
prominent. These verbsevoke the 
'imperfective-paradox' paradox. 
Furthennore, with verbs like to kill which 
involve more than one subevent, the 
progressive is related to the first subevent. I 
will therefore assume that the meaning of 
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verbs is expressed by lexical-event 
structures that capture these differences. 
Lexical-event structures contain variables 
1 7 for e and e- as subevents, s as a result state, 
'*' as an indicator of a prominent result state, 
'<' as a temporal precedence relation, and 
'<>' as a relation of temporal overlap. 12 
(8) a. to kill: el </<>CAUSE e] < s* 
b. to cross: e l < s 
(8a), for example, expresses that a killing 
involves a first causing subevent (the agent 
acting upon the theme), a second temporally 
parallel or following caused subevent (the 
theme referent dying) and a result state (the 
being dead of the theme referent). This result 
state is marked as prominent. 13 The meaning 
of this notion is admittedly vague. I suspect 
that either causative verbs that are rather 
unspecific with respect to the activities in 
the first subevent, or verbs with resultative 
particles involve prominent result states. 
Thus, the prominence marker might tum out 
to be derivable from other lexical 
infom1ation. 
Truth conditions: As a starting point for a 
more refined theory of the progressive, I will 
assume that the progressive is a three-place 
relation PROG(e,E,Persp) with the 
following truth conditions: 
(P6) The perspective approach 
PROG(e,E,Persp) is true iff 
(i) there is an event e' and a world wI 
Persp(e) such that e' occurs in wand 
e is a part of e', 
(ii) e is of event-type E where E is the 
VP translation and is associated with 
its lexically projected event structure 
LESE , 
(iii) e occurs in the actual world wO at 
reference time l and has all of the 
properties that are specified in LESE 
for the first subevent of e'. 
Choice of perspective: Finally, I will give a 
list of the semantic and pragmatic factors 
that determine the choice of perspective. In 
some cases, one perspective is forced; in 
other cases, both are equally available. The 
following list is not meant to be complete: 
We tend to choose PerspEXT i) if the 
outcome of the event is conversationally 
relevant, ii) if adverbials like in fact or 
actually occur14, iii) if the lexically specified 
result state is prominent, and iv) ifit is 
known that the event culminates. We tend to 
choose Pers/NT i) if the outcome of the 
event is not relevant, ii) if there is no 
information about the further course of the 
event available, and iii) probably by default. 
2.3 Conclusion - the problems revisited 
The preceding ideas are not meant to be a 
theory of the progressive. They rather serve 
to identifY the components that have to go 
into the semantics of the progressive. A 
strict formalization of this idea is still 
another matter. 15 Nevertheless, something 
like P6 seems to be on the right track to 
solve the problems discussed in section 1: 
the imperfective paradox does not occur 
because of PersplNT. The intemlption 
problem is solved by integrating interruption 
in the perspective functions and by 
sharpening the border between intemal and 
extemal interruptions. The impossibility 
problem is done away with by having 
introduced a possibility condition into the 
truth conditions. The intention problem does 
not occur because on the one hand, wrong or 
changed intentions are considered intemal 
interruptions, and on the other hand, if there 
is a denial of the intention to bring the event 
to a culmination, the extensional perspective 
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is chosen. The perspective problem is solved 
by evaluating the truth of progressive 
sentences relative to a perspective. And 
finally, appropriate lexical representations 
help to solve the 'imperfective-paradox' 
paradox and the complex-event problem, the 
former because prominent result states 
trigger PerspEXT, the latter because of the 
introduction of condition (ii) in the truth 
conditions. 
One last remark: I know I put Rebecca 
through a hard time. For those of you who 
are worrying about her, let me tell you one 
thing: she's absolutely fine; right now, she's 
crossing the New Jersey Turnpike during 
rush hour. 
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End Notes 
IThis research has been carried out as part of 
the project "Theory of the Lexicon" (SFB 
282), supported by the German Science 
Foundation (DFG). Comments are welcome 
and can be sent to engelb@uni-
wupperta1.de. 
2To make these different approaches 
comparable, I willrephrase them in terms of 
event semantics. Since these reformulations 
are, of course, not straightforward 
translations of the original proposals, the 
criticisms may not always carry over to the 
original approaches. 
3More precisely, the truth conditions 
Naumann and Pifion (1997) give require that 
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the speaker believe that the agent does not 
intend the non-culmination of the event, but 
even for this version the sentences in (3) are 
counterexamples. 
'+Cf. also Bononi (1997) for more refined 
examples of the perspective problem. 
s Asher (1992) and Glasbey (1996) employ 
different concepts of 'perspective' that I don't 
have space to discuss here. 
6There is an emphatic reading in which it is 
understood that the killing is not completed 
(I had to interfere; 1 mean, she was killing 
him!) which we also get for sentences in the 
simple future (She will kill him, 1 have to 
interfere!). Both have to be interpreted 
counterfactually. 
71 use the term 'proto-agent' in the sense of 
Dowty (1991). It refers to the event-
participant that has the most agentive 
properties. A proto-agent is not necessarily 
an animated being. 
8It is not quite clear if a reasonable chance is 
at all different from mere possibility. 
9 Asher (1992) assumes a default implication 
relation between the simple and the 
progressive sentence, which in some cases 
amounts to a probability condition (cf. 
Glasbey 1996). 
IOCf. also the examples in Bonomi 
(1997: 187). 
11I'm aware that this is too simple. In 
particular, the problem of incompatible 
result states has to be taken into the 
consideration (c.f., e.g., Dowty 1979. 
Naumann and Pinon 1997): Referring to a 
falling coin, both sentences the coin is 
coming up heads and the coin is coming up 
tails are odd. The progressive does not seem 
to be possible if it refers to an event that is 
part of several equally probably 
culminations of events. 
12These are only partial event structures. 
Information about semantic relations, 
temporal and other properties of subevents is 
left out here. For an overview of this lexical 
event structure theory, cf. Engelberg (1999), 
and for a more thorough presentation of the 
theory, c.f. Engelberg (1998). 
13For different purposes, Pustejovsky 
(1995:72) employs a similar concept, head 
of an event, which he relates to the notion of 
fore grounding. 
14Under scenario C, these adverbials even 
allow one to refer to a miraculous 
completion of the event; c.f. the following 
example sentence from Landman (1992:30): 
1 would never have believed it at the time, 
but she was actually crossing the Atlantic. 
15For limits of space, I have not discussed 
some recent approaches to the progressive 
like Asher (1992), Glasbey (1996), and 
Bonomi (1997), which do not change the 
overall picture of the problems we are 
confronted with very much, but rather 
provide interesting formalizations of the 
ideas of perspective, interruptions, and 
normally using, e.g., non-monotonic 
reasoning or channel theory. In particular, 
Bonomi's (1997) promising conception of 
event stereotypes deserves a more thorough 
treatment than I can give here. 
